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THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT FOR FUNDING IN
CLEMENCY: THE "MERCY" FUNCTION AND
THE ABA GUIDELINES
Laura Schaefer*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Clemency is routinely described by decision makers as an
"extraordinary" power,' which legitimates our capital punishment
system and provides a "fail-safe"' through which miscarriages of justice
can be remedied. Out of step with this lofty rhetoric, however, are many
of the practical realities of capital clemency representation. Among other
obstacles, attorneys who represent death-sentenced clients in clemency
routinely meet with considerable difficulty in securing adequate funding
to perform competently and persuasively at this critical phase of a
capital case.3 This is due, at least in part, to the haphazard way in which
* Laura Schaefer is a staff attorney with the American Bar Association's Death Penalty
Representation Project and also serves as counsel for the ABA's Capital Clemency Resource
Initiative ("CCRI'). She is the author of a recent book published by the CCRI written exclusively
for capital clemency practitioners, Defending Death-Sentenced Prisoners in Clemency. She is
deeply grateful to Lindsay Bennett, Blake Emerson, Eric M. Freedman, Emily Olson-Gault, MarieLouise Samuels Parmer, Rachel Schaefer, and Russell Stetler for their thoughtful and insightful
feedback and assistance with this Article. The views represented in this Article are the views of the
author, and do not represent the views of the American Bar Association.
1. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong, The Politics of Mercy, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 23,
(quoting former
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/23/the-politics-of-mercy
Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich about clemency, "'if you have this extraordinary power and fail
to use it, the quality and quantity of justice in your jurisdiction suffers ... "'); Tom Sherwood, Briley
Is Scheduled To Die Late Tonight, WASH. POST (April 18, 1985, 12:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2010/03/16/AR2010031602084.html ("[the
Governor's] position is that clemency is an extraordinary power ... and he would only exercise it
under extraordinary circumstances ... ").
2. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) ("Executive clemency has provided the 'fail
safe' in our criminal justice system." (citation omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Stephens, 762 F.3d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying clemency
funding request that failed to demonstrate "substantial need" for exceeding presumptive $7500
statutory funding cap); Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 572 F.3d 267, 271 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying
clemency funding request to conduct neuropsychological assessment of brain-damaged client at
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clemency funding is currently disbursed, as well as to lingering
disagreement on the part of judges, clemency decision makers, and
attorneys over how "robust" a capital clemency presentation should beand what responsibility (if any) the state has to help in that regard. As a
result of these issues, not only is it difficult to trust that clemency is able
to serve consistently as the "fail-safe" in death penalty cases; 4 but
insufficient and disparate access to clemency funding also raises serious
concerns about whether capital clemency attorneys are able to perform
this representation ethically pursuant to their obligations under the ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of the Defense
Counsel in Capital Cases ("ABA Guidelines").' And while the use of
executive clemency in death penalty cases has ebbed and flowed over
the past several decades, 6 there are indications that this power is gaining
in recognition among decision makers today-making the need for
adequate funding in this area even more pressing.7
clemency stage because motion didn't explain sufficiently why more recent examination was
reasonably necessary for clemency representation); Wood v. Thaler, No. A-09-CA-789-SS, 2009
WL 3756847, at *5-6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2009) (denying clemency funding request on grounds that
clemency investigation into intellectual disability claim was not reasonably necessary because a
court had already determined petitioner was not intellectually disabled). But see Matthews v. Davis,
807 F.3d 756, 761-62 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the district court abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's request for expert funding in clemency by relying on an erroneous legal standard and
failing to provide any other explanation for the denial of funds).
4. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411 ("This is not to say, however, that petitioner is left without a
forum to raise his actual innocence claim. For under Texas law, petitioner may file a request for
executive clemency.").
5. Am. Bar Ass'n, Guidelinesfor the Appointment and Performanceof Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases (rev. 2003), 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines].
The ABA Guidelinesare also available at https://www.ambar.org/2003guidelines.
6. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman
Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 305 (1993) ("We conclude that the exercise of
executive clemency in post-Furman capital cases is idiosyncratic at best, and arbitrary at worst.
Overall, it seems to add, rather than subtract, an element of luck in the ultimate decision of who
ends up being executed.").
7. In 2016, for example, there were no recorded state commutations in death penalty cases;
and in 2015, there was only one individual commutation issued (Kimber Edwards, Missouri). See
Clemency, DEATH PEN. INF. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited Aug. 23,
2018). But 2017 saw an impressive number of cases where death-sentenced prisoners avoided
execution on account of dogged and creative clemency efforts. That year, three capital prisoners
saw their sentences commuted: Jason McGehee (Arkansas), Ivan Teleguz (Virginia), and William
Bums (Virginia). Additionally, in Missouri, Governor Eric Greitens called off Marcelus Williams'
execution and used his clemency authority to commission a Board of Inquiry to investigate possible
innocence issues in the case. See Clemency in 2017, DEATH PEN. INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/past/22/2017 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); Virginia Governor
Commutes Death Sentence of Mentally Incompetent Death-Row Prisoner,DEATH PEN. INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6968 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). Also in 2017, the scheduled
execution of John Ramirez was called off after a Texas court found that he did not have a lawyer
available to him to file for clemency at the date his petition needed to be submitted. See Ramirez v.
Davis, 675 Fed. Appx. 478, 479 (5th Cir. 2017). And in February 2018, many observers were
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In Part I, this Article will discuss how the traditional view of the
"minimal" rights owed to death-sentenced prisoners in clemency has
contributed to the systemic inadequacy of clemency funding today. This
Part will conclude with a reminder that-regardless of how murky the
jurisprudence regarding capital clemency petitioners' constitutional
rights may be-there is nevertheless a statutory right to clemency
counsel and funding under 18 U.S.C. Section 3599(e) and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Harbison v. Bell.' In Part II, this Article will
review the different models under which capital clemency representation
is presently funded, before turning, in Part III, to an overview of the
clemency counsel duties codified in the ABA Guidelines. In Part IV, this
Article will conclude by arguing that where the federal courts hold the
purse strings to clemency funding, they should look to the scope of
counsel duties articulated by the ABA Guidelines to determine what
funding is "reasonably necessary" to provide.9 Otherwise, courts risk
shocked when the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole offered a unanimous recommendation for
clemency to Thomas "Bart" Whitaker, which prompted Governor Gregg Abbott to commute
Whitaker's sentence minutes before his scheduled execution. See Jolie McCullough, Minutes Before
Execution, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Commutes the Sentence of Thomas Whitaker, TEX. TRIB. (Feb.
22, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/02/22/texas-gov-greg-abbott-thomas-whitaker-deathsentence. This commutation marks only the third time in forty years that a Texas governor has
agreed to commute a death sentence on individual grounds. See Clemency, supra; infra note 52
(discussing the case of Raymond Tibbetts in Ohio).
8. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183-86 (2009) (holding that Congress intended for 18
U.S.C. § 3599 to authorize the provision of federal funds to attorneys representing death-sentenced
prisoners in state capital clemency proceedings); cf Mullin v. Hain, 538 U.S. 957, 957 (2003)
(vacating 5-4 a stay of execution that had been granted by the Tenth Circuit to consider the issue of
whether Congress intended for federal funding to be available to petitioners in state clemency
proceedings in light of a circuit split). While Mr. Hain was executed, the Tenth Circuit in Hain v.
Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ultimately resolved the question consistently with
Harbison (as the Supreme Court later noted). See Harbison, 556 U.S. at 194. For a discussion of
this episode, see Eric M. Freedman, No Execution ifFour Justices Object, 43 HOFSTRA L. REv. 639,
661-62 (2015).
9. As will be discussed throughout this Article, the statute under which the majority of
capital clemency attorneys seek funding, 18 U.S.C. Section 3599, provides that courts shall
authorize payment and fees for such "investigative, expert, or other services [that] are reasonably
necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt
or the sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) (2012). While this statute primarily relates to the
representation of state-death-sentenced prisoners in federal habeas proceedings, this same statute
also governs the provision of federal funding for state capital clemency representation. See
Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183-86. The question of what "reasonably necessary" means in the context of
federal habeas corpus representation has long befuddled the federal courts, leading to significant
disparity across jurisdictions in how and what expenses and services were being authorized for
defendants in these cases. In April 2018, the Supreme Court issued a rare (for a capital case)
unanimous opinion in Ayestas v. Davis, addressing the Fifth Circuit's imaginative interpretation of
"reasonably necessary" to mean "substantial need." Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1093 (2018).
The Court held that "The Fifth Circuit's test . . .is arguably more demanding [than the statutory
language] . . . [and that] Section 3599 appears to use the term 'necessary' to mean something less
than essential." Id. Because the same circuits that were using standards other than the plain meaning
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forcing clemency attorneys into an ethically untenable position: to either
perform below the standard of care owed death-sentenced clients at this
crucial stage of the capital appeals process or leave these clients to
navigate state clemency proceedings unaided by the guiding hand of
counsel.' ° Because clemency representation is often the last line of

defense before a death-sentenced prisoner faces the executioner, it is
crucial that courts meaningfully fund this critical work, and that they do

so in a manner that both reflects and comports with attorneys' ethical
and professional obligations at this stage of representation.
II. RECONCILING WOODARD AND HARBISON: DUE PROCESS BETWEEN
A "CoIN FLIP" AND "MEANINGFUL ACCESS"

Much of the difficulty capital practitioners face in securing
adequate funding for clemency representation likely can be traced to the
unique space clemency occupies in our death penalty system. Because
clemency has traditionally been viewed as an "an act of grace" within
the province of the executive branch, courts have been historically
reluctant to wade into the question of what a state's capital clemency
process should or should not entail." This, of course, extends to the

question of whether and how states provide funding for attorneys to do
this work. At the same time, given the importance of the capital
clemency decision-literally, one that can mean the difference between
life and death-courts have been wary of conceding that there is no
room for judicial intervention in clemency.
In 1998, a divided Supreme Court in Ohio Adult ParoleAuthority v.
2 reasoned that because a clemency determination
Woodard"
comes after
a death-row prisoner's conviction and sentence have been affirmed, the

of "reasonably necessary" to determine funding for federal habeas corpus related expenses were
doing so to determine the appropriate amount of clemency funding to disperse, as well, it is fair to
assume that Ayestas applies in the clemency context also.
10.
[The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse
to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process
in the constitutional sense.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1932).
11. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) ("A pardon is an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.").
12. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
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same rights and protections that attach to other stages of the death
penalty process need not apply with equal force at clemency.' 3 Instead,
the Court found, the due process protections at clemency must only be
"minimal."' 4 The process must be somewhat less arbitrary than "flipping
a coin" 1 -but not by much.16
Unsurprisingly, this decision left much to be desired in terms of
providing the states and the federal government with guidance on how to
administer their capital clemency systems. By refusing to define
"minimal due process" or provide concrete examples of how it may be
satisfied, the decision in Woodard left states with near total-discretion
over how to administer their capital clemency schemes. Today, this
discretion has resulted in significant variation in how capital clemency
review functionally operates across jurisdictions, 7 as well as a lack of
insight by practicing lawyers into what "effective" capital clemency
representation can and should look like."t Some death-penalty states
13.
It is clear that "once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore
established its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced
accordingly."... I do not, however, agree with the suggestion.., that, because
clemency is committed to the discretion of the executive, the Due Process Clause
provides no constitutional safeguards ....Thus, although it is true that "pardon and
commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts,". . .I believe
that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that some minimal procedural safeguards
apply to clemency proceedings.
Ohio Adult ParoleAuth., 523 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 289.
16. See, e.g., Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir.
2015) (holding that warden memorandum instructing prison staff not to speak to anyone
representing Ms. Gissendaner, even if they had positive things to say about her, did not constitute a
due process violation); Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1126-27 (Fla. 2009) (holding that clemency
hearing held twenty years before death warrant was signed and clemency again considered did not
violate due process, where all statute provided was that a clemency hearing would be held). But see
Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding due process violation where state
attorney threatened to fire employee for providing favorable evidence in clemency hearing).
17. See Clemency, supra note 7 (dividing states into four different models of clemency
determinations, with various additional individual caveats and exceptions to process); see also
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 187 (2009) ("By contrast, the States administer clemency in a
variety of ways; see, e.g., GA. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (independent board has clemency authority);
NEV. CONST., art. 5, § 14 (governor, supreme court justices, and attorney general share clemency
power); FLA. CONST., art. IV, § 8 (legislature has clemency authority for treasonous offenses)".);
see
also
State
Information,
CAPITAL
CLEMENCY
RESOURCE
INITIATIVE,
https://www.capitalclemency.org/state-clemency-information
(last visited Aug. 23, 2018)
(providing in-depth information on the capital clemency process of twelve current death penalty
jurisdictions).
18. The ABA Guidelines outline the sorts of efforts for clemency counsel that must be
undertaken, but failures to meet these standards are regrettably common. See ABA Guidelines,supra
note 5, at 1089-90 (Commentary to Guideline 10.15.2 "Duties of Clemency Counsel," further
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 44-47). Raphael Holiday's case is instructive as an
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have no formalized capital clemency review process, 19 whereas others
have enacted intricate frameworks for processing and evaluating capital
clemency applications.2z Similarly, some states provide death-sentenced
prisoners with state-funded counsel for clemency proceedings; 21 whereas
many others do not. Ultimately, this patchwork of clemency processes
and counsel schemes has resulted in significant arbitrariness in how
seriously a death-sentenced prisoner's request for mercy is likely to
be considered. 2
example of clemency representation that has been deemed "sufficient" by the courts. In 2015, Texas
set an execution date for Raphael Holiday. His private practice attorneys appointed under the
Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") dismissed his desire to apply for clemency, stating that in Texas,
going through the clemency process would only give Holiday "false hope." See Brandi Grisson,
Condemned Man's Lawyers Stop Helping, Cite 'FalseHope', DALLAS DAILY NEWS (Nov. 2015),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2015/11/16/condemned-mans-lawyers-stop-helping-citefalse-hope. Despite his lawyers' admonitions, Holiday wished to file a clemency petition, and
brought a motion in district court seeking to substitute his privately appointed counsel for an
attorney who would, in fact, seek clemency on his behalf See Gretchen Sween, Raphael Holiday
was Put to Death, and His Lawyers Should Have TriedHarderto Stop It, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/12/l17/raphael-holiday-was-put-to-deathand-his-lawyers-should-have-tried-harder-to-stop-it. This motion was denied, and the district court's
order was appealed to the Supreme Court. By the time the appeal came before the high court,
Holiday's original counsel did finally submit a cursory clemency petition, which Justice Sotomayor
commented "likely would have benefitted from additional preparation by more zealous advocates."
Holiday v. Stephens, 136 S. Ct. 387, 388 (2015). Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that it did
not have jurisdiction to overturn the Texas court's decision not to appoint Holiday new counsel in
clemency. Id.
19. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 124 (vesting the Governor with the sole power to grant
reprieves and commutations to persons sentenced to death); MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 124 (same).
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-204 (2018) (Arkansas administrative code governing
process for clemency review in capital cases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.07 (West 2018)
(General Assembly has delegated clemency authority to the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, which
establishes rules for clemency review and recommendation before the Governor makes the final
clemency determination).
2 1. See infra Part Ill.
22. Though not directly relevant to the questions addressed in this Article, an area that merits
further inquiry is whether there is any relationship between how a state administers its capital
clemency process and petitioners' overall likelihood of success. For example, are states more likely
to grant clemency in death penalty cases if they implement a more "formal" process for submitting
and reviewing capital clemency petitions? Or if they require a written explanation for a clemency
decision or recommendation, whether that is to affirm or deny? Interestingly, Ohio-one of the
states with the most "robust" processes for reviewing and responding to capital clemency petitions,
even though the clemency decision ultimately rests with the governor-has recently become the
state with the highest number of individual clemency grants. See Clemency, supra note 7 (showing
that Ohio has granted twenty individuals clemency since 1977). Eight of these were part of a "mass
grant" by Governor Richard Celeste in 1991, leaving the number of "individual" clemency grants in
Ohio at twelve-the most of any state in recent years. Id. Obviously a number of factors would have
to be controlled for to analyze how a death-row prisoner's "chances" at receiving a clemency grant
may be affected by whether or not the state has adopted a formal clemency process. The number of
.grants out of Ohio would seem to indicate that yes, a more formalized capital clemency procedure
does lead to an increase in clemency grants. But Virginia, which is a close-second to Ohio with ten
individual clemency grants, leaves the power completely with the executive branch and outside of
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Nine years ago, in Harbison v. Bell, without returning to the
question of what due process rights are owed capital clemency
petitioners, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether 18
U.S.C. Section 3599-the statute governing the appointment and
funding of attorneys to represent state-death-sentenced prisoners in
federal court-extended to state clemency representation as well.
Section 3599(e) provides:
Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney's own
motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed
shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent
stage of available judicial proceedings, . . . and shall also represent the
defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for
23
executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.

At issue in Harbison was whether "Congress intended to include
'24
state clemency proceedings within [Section 3599's] reach.
Specifically, petitioners argued that their federal appointment and
federal funding to represent state death-row prisoners in federal habeas
corpus proceedings also extended to representation of these same state
prisoners in state clemency proceedings. Acting as amicus curiae,25 the
U.S. Government opposed this reading, arguing instead that the statutory
language "proceedings for executive or other clemency" referred only to
federal clemency proceedings and therefore only attorneys appointed to
represent federal death row prisoners were to continue this
representation on into clemency. 26 Under the Government's
any formalized procedure. See id. (showing Virginia has granted ten capital prisoners clemency in
the last four decades). Further research is warranted into the question of whether differences in how
states choose to review capital clemency applications may impact prisoners' ability to receive
clemency relief This aspect of the disparateness in clemency processes is something to consider in
thinking about the death penalty and arbitrariness in the context of Justice Breyer's dissent in
Glossip v. Gross, for example. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J.
dissenting) ("Such studies indicate that the factors that most clearly ought to affect application of
the death penalty-namely, comparative egregiousness of the crime-often do not. Other studies
show that circumstances that ought not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race,
gender, or geography, often do.").
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012) (emphasis added).
24. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 187 (2009).
25. Respondent, the State of Tennessee, took no position on this question. See Brief of
Respondent at 7, Harbison, 556 U.S. 180 (No. 07-8521), 2008 WL 4154544. ("Question I presents
the issue whether 18 U.S.C. § 3599 provides state prisoners the right to federally appointed and
funded counsel to pursue clemency under state law. Respondent took no position on petitioner's
motion in the district court and did not file any response to the motion.").
26.
Section 3599 does not authorize federal funds for indigent state capital defendants
seeking state clemency. Section 3599 provides funds for counsel for federal defendants
facing a capital charge or prisoners actually sentenced to death and seeking
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interpretation-which echoed the reasoning in Woodard that clemency is
nothing more than a gift the executive may or may not choose to
bestow27-state prisoners under sentence of death would remain subject
to whatever scheme for providing clemency counsel (or not) a state
deigned to provide.2 8
In concluding that the plain reading of Section 3599(e) was that the
statute intended for federal funding to be available for representation of
prisoners in state clemency processes, the Court explicitly rejected the
Government's argument that "Congress simply would not have intended
to fund clemency counsel for indigent state prisoners because clemency
proceedings are a matter of grace entirely distinct from judicial
proceedings.'29 Instead, the Court found that "Congress's decision to
furnish counsel for clemency proceedings demonstrates that... it
recognized the importance of such process to death-sentenced
prisoners," and that "the sequential enumeration [of clemency at the end

postconvictioh relief in federal court. The entire structure of the statute focuses on
federal proceedings, from the requirement that attorneys be admitted to practice in
federal court to the types of proceedings in which attorneys are authorized to participate.
Brief for the Unites States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Judgment Below at 7, Harbison, 556
U.S. 180 (No. 07-8521), 2008 WL 4580044.
27.
Indeed, the statutory standard for granting COAs - "a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right,"... would be difficult to apply to a request for clemency
counsel. Although the goal of clemency is relief from the conviction or sentence, that
relief comes on discretionary rather than legal grounds . . . . Neither a clemency
application nor a request for counsel to pursue clemency implicates a constitutional right.
And although the handling of a clemency application may implicate procedural due
process rights, see Ohio Adult ParoleAuth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), any claim
of constitutional violation would be brought only after the clemency process had begun
and would be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Brief for the Unites States, supra note 26, at 12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Harbison, 556 U.S. at 192 ("The Government's arguments about § 3599's history and purposes are
laced with the suggestion that Congress simply would not have intended to fund clemency counsel
for indigent state prisoners because clemency proceedings are a matter of grace.").
28.
Petitioner and his amici devote considerable effort to establishing the relatively
uncontroversial proposition that an indigent's clemency application is more likely to be
persuasive with a lawyer's help than without it. Congress recognized as much in
providing clemency counsel for indigentfederal inmates who are sentenced to death. But
petitioner does not provide any basis from which to conclude Congress intended federal
funding for proceedings purely on the state level .... Congress could conclude,
entirely rationally, that the federal interest in indigent defense (over and above that
required by the Sixth Amendment) extends to federal-court proceedings to protect
federal constitutionalrights, but not to state clemency proceedings, which may turn on a
host of practical and political considerations and in which no distinct federal rights are at
stake.
Brief for the Unites States, supra note 26, at 30-31.
29. Harbison,556 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).
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of the capital appeals process] suggests an awareness that clemency
proceedings are not as divorced from judicial proceedings as the
30
Government submits.
Thus, rather than rely on the splintered and strained reasoning in
Woodard to determine whether death-sentenced prisoners were entitled
to government-funded representation at clemency, Harbison relied
solely on existing federal law to cement capital prisoners' statutory right
to capitalclemency counsel andfunding. Such a decision was necessary,
the Court wrote, to vindicate capital prisoners' "meaningful access to the
'fail-safe' of our justice system."3 1
By recognizing a statutory right to federally funded clemency
counsel, the Court in Harbison avoided the problems encountered in
Woodard over where and how to situate clemency within the judicial
process. Nevertheless-and as the next Part of this Article will showthe federal courts still seem reluctant to authorize the amount of
clemency funding needed to ensure zealous and high-level
representation at this critical juncture.
III. THREE MODELS FOR FUNDING
CAPITAL CLEMENCY REPRESENTATION
Broadly speaking, there are currently three models in place for
funding clemency representation in capital cases. The first model, which
will be termed the "Federal Funds Model," relies on private attorneys
who have been appointed under the Criminal Justice Act32 to represent
death-sentenced prisoners in federal habeas proceedings to continue their
representation through clemency. These are the attorneys for whom the
decision in Harbison made federal funding available under Section
3599(e), and they comprise a large portion of all attorneys performing
capital clemency representation. Typically, these attorneys submit
billing vouchers for hours worked, as well as discrete funding requests
for other clemency-related expenses (e.g., investigative costs, travel,
hiring expert witnesses) to the federal district courts for review.33 The
judges making clemency funding decisions under this model are often

30. Id. at 193.
31. Id. at 194 (citation omitted).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012).
33. Typically, funding for clemency is sought from the same district court that originally
authorized the federal habeas proceedings appointment. For more information on how funding
requests in clemency should be submitted to the District Courts for attorneys, see CJA GUIDELINES,
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, § 680 Clemency (U.S. COURTS), http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-6-ss-680-clemency#a680 10.
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faced with analyzing what expenses are "reasonably necessary"3 4 to
spend on capital clemency representation, without the benefit of
knowing what arguments may be persuasive to the state decision maker,
or when and how the clemency decision ultimately will be made. This
issue will be discussed at greater length in Part IV.
The second model, the "State Funds Model," sees state courts or
agencies assuming responsibility for providing and funding counsel in
capital clemency representation.3 5 Under this model, there is typically a
"cap" on the clemency funding available, regardless of how the money is
to be used in an individual case. In California, private attorneys
appointed by the California Supreme Court to represent capital prisoners
in clemency report being told that the total funding they will be
allotted-regardless of the particular demands of the case-is roughly
$10,000, or the equivalent of eighty hours of work.36 In Florida, the
Florida Commission on Offender Review ("FCOR")3 7 caps the total
amount of capital clemency funding available to attorneys at $10,000$5000 is paid after the clemency petition is submitted, and an additional
$5000 is paid if the attorney represents the clemency petitioner in a
34.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in every criminal action in
which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or
investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services . .. shall be entitled to the
appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in
accordance with subsections (b) through (f).
18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012) (emphasis added). In reviewing funding requests in clemency, district
court judges often struggle with what "reasonably necessary" means in the clemency context, given
that there is typically no way of knowing what sort of information may help a clemency claim "win"
with a decision maker. Whereas in the federal habeas context, this question is typically answered by
reference to what sorts of claims are cognizable on federal habeas review-and the court's
assessment of whether those claims, if developed, could entitle a petitioner to relief-the fact that in
most states clemency remains a wholly discretionary decision on the part of the executive makes
using this same logic inapposite. See infra Part IV.
35. See FLA. STAT. § 940.031 (2018) (giving the Florida Commission on Offender Review the
authority to "contract with an Attorney/Legal Entity to represent a person sentenced to death for
relief by Executive Clemency").
36. This information comes with interviews with capital practitioners in California and is also
suggested by Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgements of Death, CAL.
SUPREME COURT (Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/PoliciesMar2012.pdf. See id.
at 13, 18 (stating that the allowable compensation rate for representation in clemency is $145 per
hour and that "[r]epresentation in clemency before the Governor of California: 40-80 hrs"). Thus, at
the maximum compensation rate and number of hours, the total compensation rate for clemency
representation alone would be $11,600. According to California practitioners, however, the Court is
more likely to approve a "lump sum" amount for both habeas and clemency representation, and is
unlikely to entertain requests for additional funds beyond that lump sum. Email from Rachel
Schaefer (June 14, 2018, 3:05 PM) (on file with author).
37. Florida Commission on Offender Review, OFFICE OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, https://www.fcor.
state.fl.us/clemency.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
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hearing.3 8 This total sum of $10,000 is represented in the capital
clemency attorney contract as non-negotiable, and it is intended to cover
both the attorney's compensation for representation, as well as any outof-pocket expenses she might incur.3 9 That is to say, attorneys appointed
under the State Funds Model seemingly can choose whether to keep the
money allotted them as compensation for their individual work on the
case; or to spend this money on other aspects of the representation, such
as traveling to conduct witness interviews, hiring a mitigation or other
investigator, or employing the use of expert services.4" This model raises
38. FLA. STAT. § 940.031(2) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that the fee prescribed under
this section comprises the full and complete compensation for appointed private counsel."); see also
Agreement Between Florida Commission on Offender Review and John Doe (2015) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Redacted FCOR Contract]. In many cases, a clemency hearing is not authorized
by the Board, thus leaving the total compensation for clemency representation-to cover both hours
worked and any additional expenses-at only $5000. Additionally, the state occasionally has found
that clemency hearings conducted more than a decade ago are nevertheless considered a "sufficient"
opportunity to be heard under Florida's rules for executive clemency, even if significantly new
information about the prisoner has come to light in the years following his initial clemency
application (e.g. evidence of his good behavior and adjustment to life in prison). This is because in
Florida, clemency review used to take place immediately following the direct appeal, rather than at
the end of the state and federal appeals process, which is now the case in most states (and newly the
case in Florida). As a result, some clemency decisions about cases set for execution today are being
made on the basis of clemency processes that took place more than two decades ago. For a
discussion of precisely such an instance, see, for example, Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1316
(11th Cir. 2013) ("Mann cannot show any violation of his due process rights in the clemency
proceedings conducted by the State of Florida. The Governor conducted a full clemency hearing in
1985 before he signed Mann's first death warrant. Court-appointed counsel represented Mann at
that hearing. And Florida law did not obligate the Governor to grant Mann a second clemency
hearing before he signed Mann's current death warrant [in 2012].").
39. See Redacted FCOR Contract, supra note 38. Importantly, practitioners in Florida who
have been appointed under 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 to represent death-sentenced clients in federal
habeas corpus proceedings have reported being denied continuation of their appointment into
clemency proceedings under Section 3599(e), presumably due to the availability of Florida's own
program for providing state-funded clemency counsel through the FCOR. Whether the refusal to
reappoint federal habeas counsel to continue on in clemency and receive federal funds for this
representation constitutes a deprivation of the statutory right to the continuation of counsel into
clemency contemplated by Harbison has not yet been litigated. Suffice it to say, the inability of
certain death-row prisoners to access federal funding and representation under Section 3599(e),
despite not seeking substitution of counsel, is another troubling aspect of the way in which
clemency representation differs arbitrarily across jurisdictions.
40. In July of 2016, an attorney who was hired under this model to represent a deathsentenced prisoner in clemency sued the State of Florida and the FCOR, alleging that the terms of
the clemency representation contract-and in particular, the compensation structure-violated the
contract's explicit requirement of "competent representation." Corrected Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgement at 12, Parmer v. Florida, No. 2016-CA-001 189 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 19, 2016).
Included within the complaint was a record of email correspondence between the attorney and the
FCOR concerning the attorney's need to hire an investigator to conduct a thorough investigation
into her client's case, including into a potential innocence claim. The FCOR responded to this
request that "[t]he Commission will only provide payment as outlined in our agreement. No
additional funding for an investigator or for you is available." Id. at 6-7. Although the suit was
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a host of ethical concerns, which will be discussed in more detail
in Part IV.
The third model for funding capital clemency representation is by
conducting this work through state or federal public defender offices,
meaning that clemency representation and expenses are compensated
and covered by attorney salaries and office budgets. This can be called
the "Institutional Defender Model." Under this model, expenses for
discrete aspects of capital clemency representation-like hiring experts,
investigators, videographers, etc.-are funded through the defender
office's internal budget and earmarked and distributed upon
consideration of other case needs and expenses. This model allows
defender offices to set aside the funds they anticipate needing for
clemency, but also requires them to make preliminary judgments that
may require subsequent revision as to where and on what cases their
financial and staff resources are best spent. Nevertheless, given that
clemency case budgets are still determined internally, the Institutional
Defender Model typically allows for more flexibility in regards to
clemency expenditures than either the Federal or the State Funds
Models, and is preferable in that it does not pit the interests of the
attorney against the interests of the client by authorizing only a "lump
sum" for clemency expenses.41
TV. THE ABA GUIDELINES' ARTICULATION
OF THE DUTIES OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY COUNSEL

As the previous Parts show, significant disparities still exist in how
capital clemency representation is funded across jurisdictions. Under the
State Funds Model, practitioners typically have no flexibility in the
amount of money they are allotted, regardless of the intended purpose of
those funds. Under the Institutional Defender Model, offices will make
decisions regarding how much attorney time and overall budget to
expend on a given clemency case explicitly in light of the individual
circumstances. As mentioned previously, however, the majority of
clemency funding after the 2009 decision in Harbison now comes
through the federal courts to counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. Section
3599. This means that the federal district courts are now serving as the
primary decision makers for how much money to authorize for clemency
ultimately dismissed as the client for whom the attorney was seeking clemency received relief from
the death penalty in the judicial process, it demonstrates both the inflexibility of the FCOR to
consider individual circumstances in making funding decisions, as well as the awareness among
clemency attorneys in Florida generally of the ethical problems that this current funding model
raises.
41. See generally infra Part IV.
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representation (both in terms of attorney hours and expenses), even
though there is very little in the language of Section 3599 to help guide
the courts in making these decisions. The statute only provides that fees
42 and suggests a
and expenses should be "reasonably necessary"
presumptive cap of $7500 "unless payment in excess of that limit is
as necessary to provide fair compensation for
certified by the court.
"143
services of an unusual character or duration ....
As discussed in Part I of this Article, courts have been historically
reluctant to involve themselves in questions about clemency. But while
the decision in Harbison, by putting the federal courts in charge of
overseeing these expenses, brought clemency representation closer in
line with other aspects of capital case work, it did not resolve the
lingering question of "how" clemency representation should be
conducted or assessed. That said, courts are not without guidance as to
how to assess clemency funding requests and how to think about what
sorts of expenses-both in terms of attorney hours and others-are
appropriate to extend in this unique stage of representation. The ABA
Guidelines' "Duties of Clemency Counsel" can help courts answer the
question of what fees and services are "reasonably necessary" to
approve-and by using the Guidelines as a touchstone for evaluating
clemency funding requests, courts can also avoid putting clemency
attorneys appointed under Harbison into a situation where their
compensation forces them to perform below before the standard of care
articulated by the Guidelines.
In the nearly thirty years since the ABA Guidelines were first
published, the description of capital clemency counsel's roles and duties
has become more detailed. The first iteration of the ABA Guidelines in
1989 set out clemency counsel's duties as follows:
11.9.4 Duties of Clemency Counsel
A. Clemency counsel should be familiar with the procedures for and
permissible substantive content of a request for clemency.
B. Clemency counsel should interview the client, and any prior
attorneys if possible, and conduct an investigation to discover
information relevant to the clemency procedure applicable in the
jurisdiction.
C. Clemency counsel should take appropriate steps to ensure that
44
clemency is sought in as timely and persuasive a manner as possible.
42.

18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2) (2012).

43.

Id.

44. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES, 11.9.4, Duties of Clemency Counsel (1989) (AM. BAR Ass'N, amended 2003)
The original Guidelines are available at
[hereinafter ABA ORIGINAL GUIDELINES].
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Compared to the other guidelines in the 1989 edition, 11.94
provided relatively little by way of concrete steps an attorney must take
in this representation. The most extensive of the articulated duties of
clemency counsel was 11.9.4(B): to "conduct an investigation to
discover information relevant to the clemency procedure applicable in
the jurisdiction. 4 5 Under 11.9.4(C), while clemency attorneys were to
"take appropriate steps" to ensure that clemency was sought "in as
timely and persuasive a manner as possible," these steps were not
defined. 46 Nor was any concrete expectation of clemency counsel
outlined, other than the attorney's responsibility to "interview the client"
and "any prior attorneys, if possible."4' 7 The 1989 Guidelines-while
adopting the view that seeking clemency for a death-sentenced client
was an attorney's professional and ethical duty--did not articulate
the precise content of that duty as fully as the 2003 version of the
Guidelineswould.
In the 2003 Guidelines, the language concerning capital clemency
counsel's role and specific duties became considerably more affirmative
and precise.48 Today, under ABA Guideline 10.15.2(B), clemency
counsel is required to conduct an investigation in accordance with
Guideline 10.7, which is the guideline that governs the investigation
during the post-conviction phase of a capital case. 10.15.2(C) requires
that clemency presentations be persuasively and appropriately tailored
to the unique characteristics of "each client, case, andjurisdiction.' '49
10.15.2(D) requires clemency counsel to "ensure that the process
governing consideration of the client's application is substantively and
procedurally just"-and if it is not-to "seek appropriate redress."5

http://ambar.org/1989guidelines.
45. ABA ORIGINAL GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 11.9.4(B).
46. Id. at 11.9.4(C).
47. Id.
48. See ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at 1088 (Guideline 10.15.2: Duties of Clemency
Counsel).
A. Clemency counsel should be familiar with the procedures for and
permissible substantive content of a request for clemency. B. Clemency
counsel should conduct an investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7.
C. Clemency counsel should ensure that clemency is sought in as timely and
persuasive a manner as possible, tailoring the presentation to the
characteristics of the particular client, case and jurisdiction. D. Clemency
counsel should ensure that the process governing consideration of the client's
application is substantively and procedurally just, and, if it is not, should seek
appropriate redress.
Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
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Where before, the Guidelines urged clemency counsel to conduct
an investigation into "information relevant to the clemency procedure
applicable," the 2003 Guidelines explicitly treat clemency representation
as a vital extension of the capital post-conviction process.5 1 Moreover, in
requiring clemency counsel to "conduct an investigation in accordance
with rule 10. 7," the ABA Guidelines relate the duties of counsel at
clemency to the duties of counsel representing a death-sentenced
prisoner in court. Importantly for the question of how much funding is
appropriate to expend at clemency, the investigation required under
ABA Guideline 10.7 is non-trivial. Under this rule, counsel "at every
stage" of a capital case has an obligation, among other things, to conduct
"thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both
guilt and penalty," "a full examination of the defense provided to the
defendant at all prior phases of the case," and to "satisfy themselves
independently that the official record of the proceedings is complete and
to supplement it as appropriate." 52
51. Importantly, this is exactly the sort of reasoning that the Court relied on in Harbison in
evaluating why Congress may have intended for federal funds to be available to state-deathsentenced prisoners at clemency. See supratext accompanying note 30.
52. ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at 1015 (Guideline 10.7: Investigation). Courts should also
take into account that it is not always the case that a clemency attorney will receive a complete
record at the time of appointment and that simply ensuring the case record is complete can require
significant attorney time and expense. This is why models for funding clemency representation like
California's-capping the number of attorney hours at eighty (or about two weeks' worth of
work)-will necessarily raise ethics issues in individual cases. There are guaranteed to be certain
clemency cases where so much time has passed between when the case was last intensively
"worked" by an attorney and the clemency appointment that several weeks may be needed just to
get up to speed with the case and recover all relevant documents and materials. After completing the
record, it must be reviewed, and after reviewing the record, important strategy decisions regarding
the clemency approach must be made. While in some cases such limited expenditure for clemency
representation as contemplated by California, Florida, and sometimes even the federal courts may be
appropriate-for example, where the attorney at clemency has been zealously representing the client
and developing claims for years-in many cases, crucial information is still woefully
underdeveloped at this stage and needs tobe worked up at clemency. Raymond Tibbetts's case out
of Ohio is one such example, where the information presented fully for the first time at clemency
was so important, it inspired a juror from the original trial to advocate for clemency on Mr.
Tibbetts's behalf. Ross Geiger wrote a letter to Ohio Governor John Kasich after reading the Parole
Board's report recommending against clemency for Tibbetts, citing the inaccurate and misleading
portrait of mitigating evidence painted by the defense at trial. Had he heard mitigating information
presented at Mr. Tibbetts's clemency hearing during trial, he wrote, he "almost certainly" would
have voted for a life sentence rather than the death penalty. Karen Kasler, JurorReaches Out to
Gov.Kasich to Spare the Life of a Convicted Killer, WKSU (Feb. 5, 2018), http://wksu.org/post/
This independent outreach
juror-reaches-out-gov-kasich-spare-life-convicted-killer#stream/0.
prompted Governor Kasich to issue Mr. Tibbetts a rare reprieve of execution to ask the Parole
Board to reconsider its recommendation against clemency. Marilyn Icsman, Juror'sLetter to Kasich
Prompts Second Clemency Hearingfor CincinnatiKiller on Death Row, CINCINNATI.COM (June 14,
2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2018/06/14/jurors-letter-kasich-prompts36 002
. Although the Parole Board again
second-clemency-hearing-man-death-row/699 9
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Additionally, 10.15.2(d)'s statement that clemency attorneys must
"ensure that the process governing consideration of the client's
application is substantively and procedurally just, and if it is not, should
seek appropriate redress," illuminates clemency counsel's obligations
more fully than the 1989 Guidelines. The 2003 statement came after
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard held that there are certain
rights that require vindication and protection in clemency, but before
Harbison,which further confirmed that "far from regarding clemency as
a matter of mercy alone, [clemency is] ... the 'fail safe' in our criminal
justice system."53 But for attorneys to be able to vindicate these rights,
access the "fail safe" of the justice system, and represent clients in
accordance with the minimum standards articulated by the Guidelines,
they require adequate compensation and sufficient access to
investigative, expert, and other assistance. '
V.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN CLEMENCY REPRESENTATION:
BRINGING "REASONABLY NECESSARY" EXPENSES
IN LINE WITH THE ABA GUIDELINES

Simply put, all of the models under which clemency representation
is currently being funded have the potential to give rise to serious ethical
quandaries for attorneys. The State Funds Model is particularly
problematic, however, in that it is the most likely to set an explicit cap
on the money allotted. As discussed, in Florida, the explicit cap on
funding does not even differentiate between attorney's hours and
expenses specific to the case work-up, such as hiring experts, or
traveling to conduct an investigation or secure a witness affidavit. As a
recommended against a clemency grant, on July 20, 2018, Governor Kasich announced his decision
to commute Mr. Tibbetts's sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Kasich Grants
Reprieve to Cleveland Jackson and Commutes Sentence of Raymond Tibbetts, JOHN R. KASICH,
GOVERNOR
OF OHIO
(July
20, 2018),
http://govemor.ohio.gov/Media-Room/PressReleases/Articleld/954/kasich-grants-reprieve-to-cleveland-jackson-and-commutes-sentence-ofraymond-tibbetts-7-20-18. Without the extraordinary work done by Mr. Tibbetts's attorneys to bring
forth the wealth of mitigating information at clemency that the jury had never heard at trial, Mr.
Geiger would not have come forward, and clemency almost certainly would not have been granted.
It is probably no surprise that in this case, Mr. Tibbetts's attorneys were funded for clemency
investigation and representation under the Institutional Defender Model. Mr. Tibbetts was
represented in his clemency efforts by the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Southern
District of Ohio, which employs salaried attorneys and uses existing office resources for funding its
clemency work in individual cases. As discussed early, this model more easily allows for a full
reinvestigation of the case to be completed at clemency, as the ABA Guidelines require. And in this
case, conducting this reinvestigation-which likely would have been prohibitively expensive and
time-consuming for an attorney operating under a "capped" fee model--clearly bore fruit. Similar
examples of new information being brought to bear at the clemency stage appear in the ABA
Guidelines. See ABA Guidelines, supranote 5, at 1089 n.356.
53. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 193 (2009).
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result, attorneys are actually expected to use the money provided for
clemency representation as their own compensation, rather than to
ensure a clemency case is properly investigated and presented. The up-to
$10,000 that FCOR allows for clemency representation is a flat fee; i.e.,
the most money the agency will pay to attorneys representing a capital
prisoner in clemency. Flat fees and fee caps in capital cases have long
pitted the interests of attorneys against their clients, which is why the
ABA Guidelines have long advocated strongly against these funding
practices. "Flat payment rates or arbitrary ceilings should be discouraged
54
since they impact adversely upon vigorous defense."
These realities [of capital defense work] underlie the mandate of this
guideline that members of the death penalty defense team be fully
compensated at a rate commensurate with the provision of high quality
legal representation. The Guidelines' strong disapproval of flat fees,
statutory caps, and other arbitrary limitations on attorney
compensation is based upon55the adverse effect such schemes have
upon effective representation.

There is no question that the Florida scheme for funding clemency
representation explicitly conflicts with the Guidelines. While other State
Funding Models, like California's, are less explicit about imposing a
hard cap on funds for clemency representation, practitioners nonetheless
report that the typical practice is to allot a lump sum for each clemency
56
case, which the court will not then deviate from. This practice for
allotting clemency funding also contradicts the general principle of the
Guidelines that each capital case is unique, and therefore that decisions
regarding funding and case expenses need to be made on an
individualized basis.57 While attorneys operating under these schemes
may do everything in their power to represent their clients ethically, it is
the way in which these compensation models are structured that gives
rises to ethical problems in these cases.58
54. See ABA ORIGINAL GUIDELINES, supra note 44 (Commentary to Guideline 10.1,
Compensation).
55. ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at 984-88 (Commentary to Guideline 9.1, Funding and
Compensation) (emphasis added).
56. Email from Rachel Schaefer (June 19, 2018, 10:16 AM) (on file with author).
57. See, e.g., ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at 957 (noting as commentary to Guideline 4.1
that "[i]t bears emphasis that every situation will also have its own unique needs. The demands of
each case-and each stage of the same case-will differ.").
58. Here, practitioners should remember that clemency counsel's duties under the Guidelines
also include a responsibility to challenge procedurally or substantively unjust procedures.
"Clemency counsel should ensure that the process governing consideration of the client's
application is substantively and procedurally just, and, if it is not, should seek appropriate redress."
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The Federal Funds Model confronts clemency practitioners with a
different set of ethical difficulties. First, while under 18 U.S.C. Section
3599 there are no "flat fees" or "hard caps," there are still presumptive
caps on how much money should be spent on clemency. 59 Although
clemency funding under this Model accounts for attorney hours and
"other" expenses separately, practitioners report that courts are
nonetheless particularly strict about the "total" amount of money they
are willing to authorize in clemency-meaning that they will look at
how much a clemency case might cost overall, and make a subjective
determination as to whether that amount seems reasonable. The
longstanding notion that clemency is "not traditionally

. . .

the business

of the courts"6 appears to persist in the haphazard manner in which
clemency funding is being disbursed under Harbison.
There is another complication in the way that clemency funding
assessments are being made under the Federal Funds Model. 18 U.S.C.
Section 3599(e) only outlines the presumptively "reasonable" cost of
federal habeas representation, which it sets at $7500 (a figure that is now
widely understood to be significantly less than what is required to
conduct zealous representation at this stage). Aside from the language
that attorneys appointed under this statute "shall" continue to represent
their clients in clemency, there is no additional explanation of what that
representation should entail. And, as explained earlier in this Article,
clemency processes and procedures are so distinct that what may amount
to "reasonable" representation in one state might be seriously deficient
in another. As a result, the "reasonably necessary" language-which for
the most part only relates to expenses "reasonably necessary" to
vindicate a cognizable claim in federal habeas corpus proceedingsprovides only partial guidance for judges seeking to parse this language
in the clemency context.
In April 2018, the Supreme Court issued a rare unanimous decision
in Ayestas v. Davis rebuking the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
"reasonably necessary" under Section 3599 to mean "substantial need."'6 1

ABA Guidelines,supra note 5, at 1088 (Guideline 10.15.2(D)).
59. "Fees and expenses paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services
authorized under subsection (f) shall not exceed $7,500 in any case, unless payment in excess of
that limit is certified by the court .. " 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2) (2012). While practitioners still face
difficulty in certain jurisdictions receiving as much funding for federal habeas representation as is
clearly needed, the $7500 presumptive cap for this stage of representation is rarely enforced today.
Judges seem to be aware that doing federal habeas representation "well" will require significantly
more money expended than the $7500 cap. At clemency, however, courts appear more inclined to
use this cap as a reasonable ceiling for all clemency related expenses.
60. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
61. Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1093 (2018) ("The Fifth Circuit's test-'substantial
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(While the case was specifically concerned with funding in the federal
habeas context, given that it addresses precisely the same statute and
language as governs clemency funding, its holding is relevant to the
issues here.) There, the Court clarified, "What the statutory phrase calls
for . . . is a determination by the district court, in the exercise of its
discretion, as to whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services
as sufficiently important, guided by the considerations we set out more
fully below., 6 2 The considerations the Court then set out included
looking at the plain meaning of the word "reasonable" 63 as well as
looking to the "potential merit of the claims that the applicant wants to
pursue, the likelihood that the services will generate useful and
admissible evidence, and the prospect that the applicant will be able to
clear any procedural hurdles standing in the way.",64 In sum, Ayestas
stands for the proposition that "reasonably necessary" under Section
3599 turns on a twofold inquiry: first, a consideration of whether the
services requested are what a reasonable attorney would regard as
"sufficiently important;" and second, an assessment of whether these
services are likely to generate "useful" and usable information.
In the clemency context, of course, the second part of this inquiry
will remain subjective given the particularities of a state's clemency
process, decision maker, salient political issues, etc. In a way, this part
of the inquiry should be easierto surmount in clemency than in federal
habeas corpus cases, given that there are almost never "procedural bars"
to the type of evidence an attorney can present in clemency. And the first
part of the Ayestas inquiry-that a court should look to what a
"reasonable attorney would regard as sufficiently important"-is
critically important to bringing the funding currently allotted by the
federal courts in clemency in line with the ethical duties enshrined in the
ABA Guidelines.6 5 In seeking clemency funding before a federal district
court, a "reasonable" attorney would of course look to the scope of
duties articulated under the Guidelines to assess what sort of work is
necessary to perform. And if the federal courts start approving attorney
hours and funding requests in clemency with an eye to what the
Guidelines expect of counsel at this stage-including conducting a full
investigation of the case in line with Guideline 10.7, tailoring the
clemency presentation to the characteristics of the particular client, case,
need'-is arguably more demanding.").
62. Id. at 1093.
63. Id. (defining "reasonable" to mean "fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances"
(quoting Reasonable,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
64. Id.at 1094.
65. Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).
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and jurisdiction, and seeking appropriate redress if the clemency process
is not substantively and procedurally just-many of the current obstacles
to ethical representation in clemency would fall away.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court reminds us that "in authorizing federally
funded counsel to represent their state clients in clemency proceedings,
Congress ensured that no prisoner would be put to death without
meaningful access to the 'fail-safe' of our justice system. '66 Just as 18
U.S.C. Section 3599(e) and Harbison provide a clear entitlement to
federally appointed counsel with access to federal funding, the ABA
Guidelines and the Court's recent decision in Ayestas help the courts
understand the substantive content of this entitlement. A determination
of what expenses are "reasonably necessary" to expend in clemency
should be informed both by the specific obligations codified by the ABA
Guidelines, as a "reasonable attorney" would use these to inform her
duties in capital representation; and by an understanding of the ongoing
significance of this stage of the death penalty process and its potential to
67
stop an unjust execution.
In failing to sufficiently fund clemency representation, however,
courts and other bodies risk forcing clemency counsel to choose between
their own compensation, their ability to investigate their client's case at
guilt and punishment, their ability to appropriately "tailor" the clemency
presentation to the unique characteristics of their client, case, and
clemency jurisdiction, and the time needed to research and prepare a
potential in-court challenge to a state's clemency process. In so doing,
clemency funding authorities run the risk of forcing attorneys to fall
below the standard of care articulated by ABA Guideline 10.15.2something which the federal courts, especially, should be careful not to
condone. 68 Inadequate funding for clemency representation threatens to
undermine the only process through which a death-sentenced prisoner
can seek relief from an unjust sentence where the judicial process has
been exhausted. And as Justice Renhquist famously observed,
"clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law,
and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice "69 in
66.

Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 194 (2009).

67.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

68. See Model Justice Act, explaining that courts should be mindful to ensure that appointed
attorneys "comply with the ABA Guidelines." GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, vol. 7A, app. 2A,
§ XIV(C)(1) (U.S. COURTs 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol07a-ch02appx2a.pdf.
69. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1998).
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these cases. So long as the United States continues to exercise its
prerogative to take the lives of individuals who have broken its laws, so
too must it ensure that its "historic remedy" for avoiding miscarriages of
justice in such cases is not diluted or weakened by disparate and
arbitrary clemency funding determinations.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 6

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss4/6

22

